The author shows the importance of Hobbes’ political thought in formulating the modern state. His contractual argument did not become obsolete as his scientific method. Hobbes breaks from the Aristotelian and natural rights tradition, or rather, he gives the concept of natural right an entirely new meaning. In this context the state of nature, contract and state are logical constructs, and not concepts in direct causal relationship. Hobbes’ contract is not just a contract about the system of government; it is what society begins with. The contract is only the ground for the formation of the sociability of the individual, if it is at the same time the ground for establishing the government. The author emphasizes that, just like Kant, Hobbes and Locke consider leaving the state of nature necessary, not simply because of pragmatic reasons, but because the state has to legitimate itself as a claim of pure practical reason. Therefore, the author, following Kant, holds that the duty towards civil society and state cannot be based in the context of Hobbes’ and Locke’s philosophy, because, although the creation of state can be seen as an act of prudence, that in itself does not show a real obligation to pass from the state of nature to the state of law. The author also notes Hobbes’ error in constructing a state independent from ownership. Contrary to him, Kant reasonably and legally bases theory of property as decisive part of his contractualism and creates a philosophical and legal foundation for the philosophy of the state.

Autor pokazuje važnost Hobbesova političkog mišljenja u formiranju novovjekovne države. Njegov kontraktualistički argument preživljava zastarjelu znanstvenu metodu. Hobbes čini raskid s aristotelijanskom i prirodnopravnom tradicijom, odnosno pojmovima prirodnoga prava upisuje posve novo značenje. U tom su kontekstu prirodno stanje, ugovor i država logički konstrukti, a ne posljedično-uzročni slijed. Hobbesov ugovor nije samo ugovor o vladavinskom poretku, nego njime nastaje i društvo. Ugovor je temelj podruštvljenja individuuma samo tada ako je istodobno temelj uspostave vladavine. Autor ističe kako i Kant, poput Hobbesa i Lockea izlazak iz prirodnog stanja smatra nužnim, ali ne iz čisto pragmatičkih razloga, nego se država mora legitimirati kao zahtjev čistoga praktičnoga uma. Stoga autor, slijedeći Kanta, smatra kako se dužnost prema građanskom društvu i državi ne može utemeljiti u kontekstu filozofije Hobbesa i Lockea jer iako stvaranje države može biti čin mudrosti, samim time se ne pokazuje pravna obvezatnost prelaska od prirodnog stanja prema stanju prava. Također, autor smatra Hobbesovim deficitom kad državu konstituira neovisno o vlasništvu. Za razliku od njega Kant utemeljuje umnopravno teoriju vlasništva koja je odlučna za njegov kontraktualizam i tvori filozofskopravni temelj za filozofiju države koja time zadobiva svoju pravnu potpunost.