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ABSTRACT: This paper examines the impact of agency problem on the relation between staggered board and firm value. Addressing the endogeneity problem, I find that staggered board is not necessarily value destroying. Further, I show that the impact of staggered board is not conditional on the severity of agency problem. The result is against the argument that the impact of staggered board differs in different firm types. The finding suggests that a firm optimally adopts and abolishes staggered board. Keywords: staggered board, corporate governance, agency problem, firm value
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