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We enjoy immediate knowledge of our own limbs and bodies. I argue that this knowledge, which is also called proprioception, is a special form of perception, special in that it is, unlike perception by the external senses, at the same time also a form of genuine self–knowledge. The argument has two parts. Negatively, I argue against the view, held by G. E. M. Anscombe and strengthened by John McDowell, that this knowledge, bodily self–knowledge, is non–perceptual. This involves, inter alia, rescuing from McDowell’s attack the very idea of receptive self–knowledge (of which perceptual self–knowledge is a species). On the positive side, I develop, by drawing on the work of Brian O’Shaughnessy, a detailed account of bodily self–knowledge as a special form of perception. This account spells out how this special form of perception is epistemologically mediated by sensations of a special class of primary qualities —vital–dynamic sensations as I call them— in one’s limbs