In this paper, we present the first techniques to automate the discovery of new censorship evasion techniques purely in the application layer. We present a general solution and apply it specifically to HTTP and DNS censorship in China, India, and Kazakhstan. Our automated techniques discovered a total of 77 unique evasion strategies for HTTP and 9 for DNS, all of which require only application-layer modifications, making them easier to incorporate into apps and deploy. We analyze these strategies and shed new light into the inner workings of the censors. We find that the success of application-layer strategies can depend heavily on the type and version of the destination server. Surprisingly, a large class of our evasion strategies exploit instances in which censors are more RFC-compliant than popular application servers. For the purposes of the artifact evaluation, our artifacts are (1) the strategies we present in the paper and (2) the code used to implement them. We developed our fuzzer by building off of the open-source Geneva project (https://github.com/Kkevsterrr/geneva), but our code has not yet merged into that repository publicly. For this reason, the code is uploaded here, and once it merges, the final stable URL will be replaced with a stable ref to Geneva's repository. For this artifact evaluation, we demonstrate how the reader can evaluate (1) that our strategies can generate modified requests; (2) that our strategies can evade censorship. Optionally, the evaluator can test for themselves that our tool can fuzz HTTP requests.