
This paper considers the applicability of Common Criteria (CC) to ‘minimally necessary (complete) separation platform’ comprising underlying hardware and separation (virtualisation) kernel and shares our experience in modelling the security policy for the MILS separation platform. We present our results on the MILS Protection Profile for Complete Separation Platform (MILS CSP PP).
Virtualization, Common Criteria, Underlying Hardware Platform, Separation Kernel, Operating System, Embedded Systems, MILS (Multiple Independent Levels of Security), Protection Profile, Hypervisor
Virtualization, Common Criteria, Underlying Hardware Platform, Separation Kernel, Operating System, Embedded Systems, MILS (Multiple Independent Levels of Security), Protection Profile, Hypervisor
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