The Antwerp case demonstrates that rules regarding debts were crafted in response to diverse and connected phenomena. Lawmakers took into account mercantile practice, even though special circumstances could partly be responsible for legal change as well. The outcome of processes of legislative deliberation was influenced yet not determined by market conditions. Legislators had to retrieve solutions for which there was no blueprint. They had to balance different interests. The legal regime concerning collateral rights proved a challenge for the Antwerp administrators. Le Marchand was right in saying that in Antwerp the dowry was at one point considered a super-priority, but this was only during the period 1523–1548. In spite of Le Marchand’s overrating of dowry preferences in bankruptcy cases, his explanation of collateral rights as crucial features of municipal legal constellations is correct. Cities of trade had extensive autonomy over the rules that applied to the contracts that were drafted in their markets. In that regard, the contractual autonomy of creditors and debtors was always limited. Municipal bylaws stipulated hierarchies of debts, and the rules in these bylaws defined how claims were to be enforced.