{"references": ["Commission Regulation (EC) No 773/2004 of 7 April 2004 relating to the conduct of proceedings by the Commission pursuant to Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty OJ L 123, 27.4.2004, pp. 18\u201324.", "Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 of 21 December 1989 on the control of concentrations between undertakings, OJ L 395, 30.12.1989, p. 1\u201312.", "Commission Notice on cooperation within the Network of Competition Authorities, OJ C 101, 27.04.2004, p. 43-53 (hereafter, 'the Network Notice').", "Council Recommendation concerning co-operation between Member Countries on restrictive business practices affecting international trade [C(67)53(Final)] of October, 5 1967.", "OECD (2013) International Enforcement Co-operation Secretariat Report on the OECD/ICN Survey on International Enforcement Co-operation, p. 57. Available from: https://www.oecd.org/daf/ competition/InternEnforcementCooperation2013.pdf [Accessed September, 12 2020].", "OECD (2013) International Enforcement Co-operation Secretariat Report on the OECD/ICN Survey on International Enforcement Co-operation, p. 59-60.", "udgement of US States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit) [1976] Timberlane Lumber Co. v Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597. Available from: https://law.resource.org/pub/us/case/reporter/F2/549/549. F2d.597.74-2813.74-2812.74-2354.74-2142.html [Accessed September, 12 2020]. The so-called jurisdictional rule of reason test based on comity principles put forward in this judgment was later rejected by the US Supreme Court in [1993] Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v California. US Supreme Court, 509, p. 764.", "OECD (2005) Best practices for the formal exchange of information between competition authorities in hard core cartel investigations, Recital 5. Available from: https://www.oecd.org/competition/ cartels/35590548.pdf [Accessed November, 2 2020].", "OECD (2013) International Enforcement Co-operation Secretariat Report on the OECD/ICN Survey on International Enforcement Co-operation, pp. 164 et seq.", "LAITENBERGER, J. (2017) Closer Together: the Case for International Cooperation, Concurrences Review Event, September, 14 2017. Available from: https://ec.europa.eu/competition/speeches/text/ sp2017_12_en.pdf [Accessed September, 12 2020].", "EC (2014) White Paper: Towards more effective EU merger control (COM/2014/0449 fnal), para. 6-22. Available from: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=celex%3A52014DC0449 [Accessed September, 12 2020]."]}

This unit was published in „International Cooperation of Competition Authorities in Europe: from Bilateral Agreements to Transgovernmental Networks” Błachucki, M., ed., (2020). Competition authorities are liable to cooperate with one another on many levels, through formal and less formal channels, with exchanges ranging from general policy considerations to case-specific intelligence and evidence. Where applicable, the legal bases for such cooperation vary in nature, scope and depth. The state of play as regards cooperation arrangements outside the EU provides a useful backdrop against which to assess the specificities and limitations of enabling instruments at the EU level. In particular, the glaring gap between existing frameworks for cooperation among NCAs in, antitrust and merger control matters does not necessarily reflect the prevailing situation outside the EU, or models advocated in international fora such as the OECD. This underscores the specific historical and political underpinning of the current EU legal framework. As regards the particularly potent instruments for cooperation established under Regulation 1/2003, there is also room for deepening and expanding, as illustrated by the recently adopted Directive 2019/1. Again, non-EU international arrangements can inform and have indeed informed, perhaps surprisingly, the course chosen to improve these cooperation instruments.