The Dark Forest hypothesis proposes that technologically advanced civilizations may remain silent because revealing their existence could expose them to destruction by unknown competitors. In its strongest form, the hypothesis appears to favor preemptive attack: if another civilization might eventually become capable of destroying you, eliminating it before it can act may appear strategically rational.This paper examines that proposition using a simplified game-theoretic framework. It compares strategies of hiding, broadcasting, preemptive attack, and a fourth strategy introduced here as “Quiet but Armed.” Rather than assuming that preemption is automatically dominant, the model expresses its attractiveness as a function of attack success, retaliation risk, concealment failure, the probability of cooperative behavior, and the potential benefits of cooperation.The analysis shows that “Attack First” becomes rational only under a restricted set of assumptions. If attacks can fail, retaliatory capabilities survive, or credible defenses reduce the probability of successful extermination, deterrence can replace preemption as a stable equilibrium. If the expected probability and benefits of cooperation are sufficiently large, communication may also become rational.The Dark Forest is therefore not an inevitable consequence of rational behavior. It represents one region of a broader strategic parameter space in which preemption, deterrence, concealment, and cooperation compete as possible equilibria.