Version 4.1 (16 August 2026). Cite-hygiene revision of 10.5281/zenodo.21971428 (v4). Concept DOI (always latest PDF): 10.5281/zenodo.19265271. Architecture, overlay, and analysis are unchanged. What changed since v4 First JIATF-401 task order stated as USD 87 million and pinned to DefenseScoop and Breaking Defense, which print that figure (Defense Daily's lede says 87.7; that source is no longer used for the dollar amount). "Ordering guide" cited to those two plus Defense Daily; "no money attached" pinned to Breaking Defense only. Maven program-of-record designation moved off the Golden Dome software story and onto the 20 March 2026 Reuters report of the Feinberg letter. Golden Dome Anduril–Palantir software collaboration stays on the 24 March Reuters item; consortium and summer-2026 test pinned to the same-day Wall Street Journal exclusive. Companion DOI in the header is the Golden Dome concept (10.5281/zenodo.19368681); the reference list pins the live v8.1 PDF. What did not change. Platform/tenant framing; AOM skeleton as analytical convenience; ASI09 as primary failure mode; deployability split; SDK v4.24.0 pin; SME-review hygiene from v4. Abstract. LatticeOS is not an AI operating system. It is a data ontology enforcement layer with a tasking bus. This technical position note maps LatticeOS (Python SDK v4.24.0 as of July 2026) onto a 4-layer Autonomous Operations Model (AOM) skeleton (cognitive, coordination, control, and governance) and identifies the gap between what the platform currently provides and what a complete AOM implementation requires. The core finding is that the traceability and governance problem is a tenant observability problem, not a platform problem: the ML inference workloads running on top of Lattice require instrumentation, not the message bus itself. The paper specifies a minimal governance overlay: signed intent capsules with MIO constraint chains, a rule-based auditor agent, OpenTelemetry sidecar tracing on edge nodes, an anti-complacency human decision UI, and a phased implementation roadmap with explicit numerical gates. The USD 20B U.S. Army enterprise contract is identified as a delivery vehicle for governance updates at software-update cadence if Anduril and the Army choose to order them that way; it is a ceiling on a firm-fixed-price IDIQ, not an obligated program. The primary failure mode is identified as automation complacency (OWASP ASI09), not AI error: the structural defense is a forced-choice operator UI that requires active classification commitment rather than passive approval. An evidence table with source-type and confidence ratings and a full limitations section accompany the analysis.