
Can a “market” of competing internal modules—each with distinct preferences, staking their own resources on decisions, and subject to monopoly-breaking revolution mechanisms—produce better collective behavior than a single unified agent? We build a minimal experimental framework where multiple neural policy modules compete for action execution rights in a multi-resource GridWorld survival environment, testing five sequential hypotheses over more than fifty experimental configurations. We find that: (1) naive market competition collapses into monopoly; (2) an antitrust revolution mechanism successfully breaks monopoly and maintains diversity; (3) state-aware arbitration improves resource collection by 6× but does not surpass the single-agent baseline; (4) input-level differentiation via optimistic perceptual bias is cleaner than reward-level distortion; and (5) a learnable arbitrator achieves the first instance where the market surpasses the single agent on survival steps (83.3 vs. 73.6, with 3.5× lower variance). However, the market consistently underperforms in raw resource collection efficiency. We identify the coordination cost ceiling—the overhead of multi-module arbitration exceeds the benefit of specialization at small scale—as the fundamental limiting factor, and discuss conditions under which this ceiling may be overcome in larger systems.
AI Alignment, Coordination Cost, artificial-intelligence, reinforcement-learning, Agent Specialization, multi-agent-systems, Internal Market Mechanism, Evolutionary Game Theory, Modular AI Systems, Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning, Mixture of Experts
AI Alignment, Coordination Cost, artificial-intelligence, reinforcement-learning, Agent Specialization, multi-agent-systems, Internal Market Mechanism, Evolutionary Game Theory, Modular AI Systems, Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning, Mixture of Experts
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