ABSTRACT: Development from pre-colonial indigenous governance systems through colonial institutional structures, post-independence parliamentary democracy, military rule, and the contemporary presidential system under the 1999 Constitution. It argues that while legislative institutions in Nigeria have undergone significant constitutional transformation, their practical effectiveness has been consistently constrained by enduring structural factors including colonial executive dominance, limited representation in early legislative councils, ethnic and regional fragmentation in the First Republic, and prolonged disruption under military rule. The study further analyses the post-1999 legislature, highlighting its constitutionally entrenched powers, judicial reinforcement of legislative authority, and the institutional role of committees in modern governance. Despite these formal advancements, the legislature continues to face challenges relating to executive influence, weak oversight capacity, and political party dominance. The paper concludes that Nigeria’s legislature reflects a historical continuity of institutional weakness, best conceptualised as a “lame giant”, formally empowered but practically constrained. It recommends structural reforms aimed at strengthening legislative independence, enhancing oversight mechanisms, and consolidating democratic accountability in order to bridge the gap between constitutional design and legislative performance. Keywords: Nigerian legislature; history and evolution; constitutional development; legislative effectiveness