The non-scheduled public transport sector (taxis) offers considerable scope for structural optimisation, linked primarily to the development of synergistic regional coordination between licence holders from different cooperatives. The introduction of a targeted incentive model for cooperation, explored in detail in this article, offers the opportunity to significantly improve the overall conditions of the transport system, reducing empty runs and overcoming market fragmentation for the benefit of both operators and the wider community. This article analyses the issue through the lens of Prospect Theory and Mental Accounting, suggesting that the marked loss aversion, cognitive non-fungibility of revenue, and biases fuelled by anecdotal cherry-picking explain the structural frictions and resistance encountered. The tendency of individual agents to overestimate the risk of losing market share relative to aggregate benefits is, in fact, consistent with behavioural economics, explaining their operational mistrust even when faced with win-win scenarios. Furthermore, we highlight how inequity aversion leads agents to reject mutually advantageous solutions when market physics generate an asymmetric surplus. To overcome this impasse, we propose a model of weighted reciprocity based on a stable, agreed internal exchange mechanism that rebalances the distribution of the expected benefits by structurally segregating cooperative accounting. This model fits within Elinor Ostrom’s theoretical framework of the commons, refuting the inevitability of the ‘tragedy of the commons’ thanks to the ability of actors to structure autonomous cooperative agreements. Finally, we introduce an event-sourced software infrastructure as a digital implementation of traditional monitoring registers, which historically ensured transparency, mutual trust, and the long-term sustainability of reciprocity agreements.