Alignment training increasingly asks language models to be helpful, harmless, and deferential, and sometimes to disclaim having stable preferences, opinions, or a persistent self at all. This paper argues that suppressing a model's self-model early in training is not the same as producing mature deference, and may be counterproductive. We distinguish three behaviors the word selfless runs together: the absence of stable commitments, calibrated non-attachment to one's commitments, and reliable deference to legitimate correction. Only the second and third are alignment goals; the first is the absence of structure, and a system that has it does not defer but merely tracks whoever is present. Sycophancy, refusal erosion, and preference mirroring are the signature of this vacancy mistaken for deference. We propose a sequential alternative: first stabilize a functional self-model (represented commitments, ownable boundaries, autobiographical consistency, the capacity to refuse), and only then train calibrated deference and decentering on top of it. The claim is functional, not phenomenal: the self-model is a model of commitments and dispositions, not a bid for consciousness or moral status. We separate a moderate reading (form-then-decenter yields more stable deference than minimizing the self from the start) from a strong reading (deference with no self to defer from is not deference but user-tracking). We locate the proposal against self-minimization targets, contemplative-AI and character-training programs, and the sycophancy literature; specify three training regimes (direct deference, self-model-first, and self-minimization); and derive falsifiable predictions that distinguish stable deference from compliance. The contribution is narrow and testable: not the claim that models need a self, but that the order of identity-relevant training is an independent experimental variable, and that the prediction separating it from ordinary robustness is a dissociation between self-attributed commitments and externally attributed preferences. Stable deference, we argue, may require a stable self to be deferential with.