
UK courts scrutinise state coercion rigorously but pay far less attention to how government shapes public choices through information, framing, and behavioural methods. Units such as the Home Office’s Research, Information and Communications Unit (RICU) lawfully produce counter-extremism campaigns and maintain pre-prepared contingency communications for rapid deployment after incidents. The issue is not whether such activity should exist, but how courts can assess its legality when methods remain unpublished. This Article argues that proportionality doctrine, as set out in *Bank Mellat v HM Treasury (No 2)*, already supplies the framework. The four questions—legitimate aim, rational connection, necessity, and fair balance—apply to informational measures as readily as to physical ones. What is missing is a reviewable duty of transparency about general methods and purposes. Without it, courts cannot apply *Bank Mellat* meaningfully, and rights under Arts 8 and 10 ECHR are hard to enforce. The proposal synthesises existing principles from *Halford*, *Silver*, *Simms*, *Moseley*, *Magyar Helsinki Bizottság*, and *S and Marper*. It engages national security, emergency deference, executive prerogative, and state expressive interests, while situating the UK position against EU and French developments. Two documented cases illustrate the practical stakes. A modest transparency duty—requiring ministers to publish a short statement of purpose, audience selection, and correction mechanisms—would enable consistent judicial review without halting government communication.
