This study quantitatively analyzes the statistical normality of refereeing decisions (penalties, direct red cards, and yellow cards) in the five major European leagues during the 17 seasons between 2001-2002 and 2017-2018. This period coincides chronologically with documented payments made by FC Barcelona to companies owned by José María Enríquez Negreira, then vice-president of the RFEF's Technical Committee of Referees (CTA). By constructing a Composite Index of Refereeing Anomalies (ICA) validated against playing-style confounds and applying non-parametric tests (Mann-Whitney and Fisher's combined probability test) along with linear regression models with fixed effects for each team and season, a severe anomaly favoring FC Barcelona is identified. Fisher's exact test yields a cumulative p-value of 0.00027, confirming the extreme statistical significance of the phenomenon compared to pure chance. The counterfactual model estimates a net competitive benefit for the club ranging from 6.8 to 11.6 points per season, with a central scenario of 9.2 points on average. Finally, the external validation of the model using the case of Juventus (2001-2006) and the identification of a structural break in the subsequent period (2018-2023)—where FC Barcelona's refereeing indicators immediately steadily converge toward the mean of the broader pool of clubs after the cessation of payments—robustly support the hypothesis of a systematic anomaly linked to FC Barcelona's capture of the regulatory institutional framework.