In contemporary psychotherapy, mindfulness practices, and self-help discourse, individuals are often encouraged to “accept their emotions” or “accept themselves as they are.” However, this practice can involve a paradoxical difficulty: the more one attempts to accept one’s emotions, the more self-blame and self-disgust may be intensified. The starting point of this paper is to understand this paradox not merely as a practical failure, but as a problem arising from the attributional structure of inner reactions. The expression “accepting one’s emotions” appears, at first glance, to be a moderate and non-self-denying attitude. Yet it often contains an implicit premise of ownership and attribution: the emotion is treated as “mine” and attributed to the personal self. When socially, ethically, or practically undesirable inner reactions arise, such as jealousy, anger, excessive appetite, the desire to procrastinate, anxiety, or the need for approval, they are often interpreted in the form of “I am jealous,” “I want to be lazy,” or “I am weak.” In such cases, acceptance can easily turn into personal evaluation. As a result, secondary suffering emerges: “I am a bad person for having such feelings” or “I am immature.” This self-disgust loop can make problem-solving and behavioral regulation even more difficult. This paper redefines such self-blame not as a moral or personal failure, but as a misattribution within cognitive architecture. More precisely, self-blame is the process of misattributing the output of lower adaptive systems to the personal self. Human beings possess multiple lower adaptive systems related to danger avoidance, energy conservation, individual maintenance, loss avoidance, status confirmation, immediate reward acquisition, reproductive reactions, and related functions. These systems automatically produce desires, emotions, rumination, avoidance tendencies, and impulses in response to particular inputs. However, the mere occurrence of such outputs does not mean that they constitute the essence of one’s personality, nor does it mean that one ought to act on them. To avoid this misattribution and to handle inner reactions more structurally, this paper proposes the Deep Functional-Goal Observation Model. In this model, desires and emotions are observed not as personal truths or behavioral commands, but as outputs of lower adaptive systems. What matters is not to take their surface content at face value, but to infer what the system generating them is functionally trying to maximize or avoid. This paper refers to this functional directionality as a “deep functional goal.” For example, behind the surface desire “I want to eat something sweet,” there may be deep functional goals such as securing energy, obtaining immediate reward, or reducing stress. Likewise, behind the desire “I want to do nothing even though I have something I must do,” there may be multiple overlapping lower-level goals, including energy conservation, failure avoidance, loss avoidance, immediate reward acquisition, and avoidance of cognitive load. From this perspective, procrastination, overeating, and anger do not immediately indicate personal defects. Rather, they can be understood as functional reactions produced by multiple lower systems in response to the present environment. The central claim of this paper is that an effective response to inner reactions is neither self-blame, repression, nor mere acceptance. What is required is to detect the inner reaction, suspend self-blame, identify the surface desire, infer the lower system that is operating, observe its deep functional goal, compare it with higher-order values, and then determine whether to grant it behavioral authority. This series of operations is here described as system-metacognition. Behavioral authority refers to the authority by which an inner reaction determines an actual course of action. The occurrence of a desire is not the same as acting on that desire. The occurrence of anger is not the same as attacking another person. The occurrence of anxiety is not the same as repeatedly engaging in checking behavior. The occurrence of appetite is not the same as fully obeying it. This model separates the occurrence of desire from the adoption of action and proposes that behavioral authority should be managed through higher-order value control. Furthermore, this paper emphasizes that observing deep functional goals does not mean justifying desires or impulses. Lower adaptive systems do not operate for the sake of ethical goodness. They often generate outputs biased toward one’s own adaptive advantage, such as individual maintenance, resource acquisition, loss avoidance, status preservation, mating opportunity, or immediate reward. Therefore, observing lower-level functional goals does not mean idealizing their selfish directionality. Rather, it means recognizing that directionality calmly, comparing it with ethics, law, the rights and dignity of others, and long-term self-identity, and, when necessary, blocking behavioral authority. Accordingly, this paper clarifies the problem of ownership and attribution hidden within the practice of emotional acceptance and redefines self-blame as the misattribution of lower-system outputs to the personal self. It then presents a theoretical framework in which desires and emotions are observed not as “the self itself,” but as outputs of lower adaptive systems, whose deep functional goals are compared with higher-order values. The aim of this paper is neither to deny inner reactions nor to affirm them unconditionally. Rather, it is to observe inner reactions, infer their generative sources, understand their functional directionality, and manage which outputs are granted behavioral authority. Through this shift, a new psychological and philosophical framework becomes possible: from self-blame to system-metacognition, from personal evaluation to functional analysis, and from ownership of emotion to observation of output.