A persistent error in contemporary discourse on artificial intelligence is the application of phenomenal predicates (thinks, feels, understands, wants, knows) to systems that perform functional mimicry. These predicates name properties of a subject undergoing experience. The systems in question have no subject and undergo nothing; they generate outputs whose surface resembles the products of mind. To describe such outputs in the vocabulary of consciousness is not a harmless metaphor but a petitio principii: it presupposes, in its very terms, the interior life whose existence is the question at issue. This paper argues that once the borrowed vocabulary is removed, nothing remains to be proven, only something to be stated. The conclusion takes the form of a single line. It is given on its own. The full argument that earns it, the structural barriers to phenomenal instantiation in computational systems, the differentiation account of selfhood, and the diagnosis of the question-begging loop in mainstream emergentism, is developed elsewhere.