This paper examines the constitutional function of the reserve powers of the Governor General within Canada's system of parliamentary democracy and responsible government. It argues that, although rarely exercised and largely governed by constitutional convention rather than codified law, reserve powers remain important constitutional safeguards during periods of political crisis, minority government, and uncertainty regarding parliamentary confidence. Using a doctrinal and comparative constitutional methodology, the paper analyzes key Canadian constitutional episodes, including the King–Byng Affair and the 2008 prorogation crisis, and situates them within the broader tradition of Westminster constitutionalism. Comparative analysis of the United Kingdom, Australia, and India demonstrates how reserve powers operate across Westminster-derived systems to preserve democratic continuity, maintain responsible government, and provide mechanisms for resolving constitutional deadlock. The paper concludes that reserve powers should not be understood as obsolete remnants of monarchical authority. Rather, they function as latent constitutional safeguards that help preserve parliamentary accountability and democratic stability when ordinary political processes become strained. The study contributes to contemporary scholarship on constitutional conventions, responsible government, and comparative Westminster constitutionalism.