ABSTRACT: The debate regarding regional head elections in Indonesia has tended to be trapped in a dichotomy between direct elections by the people and indirect elections through the Regional People's Representative Council (DPRD). This article argues that this dichotomous framework masks deeper structural problems in local democracy. Drawing on the perspectives of democratic theory and political economy, this analysis examines how various regional head election mechanisms interact with elite power, high political costs, and the dynamics of government decentralization. Through a qualitative, comparative, and interpretive approach, this study demonstrates that neither direct elections nor elections through the Regional People's Representative Council (DPRD) can be understood as inherently democratic or undemocratic. Direct elections tend to generate symbolic legitimacy and high electoral participation, but are often distorted by clientelism, identity mobilization, and oligarchic domination. Conversely, elections through the Regional People's Representative Council (DPRD) offer procedural efficiency and political stability, but often weaken public legitimacy and strengthen elite control. These findings confirm that changes in election design alone are insufficient to deepen local democracy. Democratic outcomes are more determined by the power relations and institutional capacities that mediate the electoral process. By reviewing regional head elections beyond procedural debates, this article contributes to the discourse on decentralized democratization and elite adaptation in Indonesia.