The Strait of Hormuz has long been recognized as a critical maritime chokepoint for global oil supplies, with approximately 20% of the world's petroleum transiting its narrow waters. However, a parallel and arguably more consequential vulnerability has remained largely absent from scholarly and policy discourse: the concentration of undersea fibre-optic telecommunications cables traversing this same waterway. These cables carry approximately 95% of intercontinental internet traffic, underpinning global financial systems, cloud infrastructure, government communications, and digital commerce. This study conducts a critical analysis of the undersea cable infrastructure in the Gulf region, mapping the concentration of cables passing through the Strait of Hormuz and assessing the geopolitical, economic, and cybersecurity implications of this hidden vulnerability. Employing a qualitative analytical approach grounded in critical infrastructure studies, international relations theory, and geopolitical analysis, the paper examines the dual risks of intentional targeting and accidental disruption of these cables. It argues that the Strait of Hormuz constitutes not only an oil chokepoint but also a "data chokepoint", which is a concentration of information infrastructure whose disruption would have cascading consequences for global digital connectivity, financial stability, and international security. The study contributes to emerging scholarship on critical infrastructure protection, maritime security, and cyber-geopolitics by highlighting a vulnerability that has been systematically overlooked in favour of more visible energy security concerns. The paper concludes with policy recommendations for diversifying cable routes, enhancing physical protection mechanisms, and developing international frameworks for undersea infrastructure protection.

Copyright © 2026 by the authors. | Repository URL: https://journal.jcarm.in/index.php/home/issue/archive | Development Status: Active