This qualitative study examines the political economy of Security Sector Reform (SSR) programming in post-civil war Mozambique, arguing that international donor-led initiatives have largely failed to transform the security sector into an accountable, effective, and legitimate institution. It contends that externally designed SSR programmes, by treating the security sector as a technical and apolitical domain, have systematically underestimated the entrenched role of the security apparatus within the ruling party's political and economic patronage networks. The analysis demonstrates how the Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO) elite has instrumentalised SSR resources and processes to consolidate its own power, often co-opting or subverting reform objectives. Consequently, the study finds that SSR has contributed to a form of 'hybrid' state-building, reinforcing a regime security model rather than fostering a citizen-centric security governance framework. The findings underscore the critical importance of grounding SSR in a nuanced understanding of domestic political settlements and elite incentives.