This document represents the first version of the deliverable and is subject to review and approval by the European Commission. Following this process, and once any revisions deemed necessary have been duly incorporated, an updated version of the deliverable will be submitted and made available accordingly.This Deliverable 8.1 Summary of Findings forms part of Work Package 8 of the HorizonEurope UNTWIST project. It presents key insights drawn from the analysis of the UNTWISTsurvey dataset—one of the project’s central empirical contributions—designed to explore therole of gendered identities, perceived status loss, and political behaviour in contemporaryEurope. The results offer valuable empirical evidence to assess core project hypotheses andsupport the development of grounded, country‐specific policy recommendations.The UNTWIST survey was conducted between October 2024 and January 2025 in sixEuropean countries: Denmark, Germany, Hungary, Spain, Switzerland, and the UnitedKingdom. The survey targeted adult population, with a total of 10,356 interviews collectedthrough Computer‐Assisted Web Interviewing (CAWI). After quality control, 9,698 valid caseswere included in the final dataset. To ensure the inclusion of voters with lower prevalence instandard samples—specifically, those who support right‐wing populist parties (RWPPs)—atargeted “Boost” sample was incorporated using a vote propensity question. Sampling wasstratified by age, sex, education, and geographic region, with data weighting applied tomaintain representativeness. The dataset, numeric in format and openly accessible onZenodo (DOI: https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.15083113 ), follows FAIR data principles andis provided in CSV, SAV, and DTA formats. While technical documentation is openly available,microdata access is embargoed until March 31, 2026.The structured questionnaire consisted of 60 closed‐ended questions (over 100response categories), covering political attitudes, voting behaviour, values, and sociodemographics.Fieldwork was divided into pilot, main, and Boost phases, with careful designand implementation across countries led by VERIAN and coordinated by DEUSTO. The surveyemployed a master version adapted to each national context and incorporated technicalrefinements after a soft launch. Overall, the instrument was designed to align with thetheoretical framework and hypotheses set out in earlier stages of the project, particularlythose concerning gender status perceptions, collective identity, and support for RWPPs.A key area of focus in this report concerns individuals who perceive themselves asLosers of Feminism—those who believe that recent social, economic and cultural changesassociated with feminism and gender equality have disadvantaged them. This includes bothmen and women who report status loss or threat, express anger about these experiences,and, in some cases, attribute responsibility to feminism. Though only a minority ofrespondents fall fully into this profile, the findings indicate that this narrative is significantlymore common among RWPP voters, particularly men. These perceptions reflect broaderfeelings of gendered positional deprivation, in which individuals view their social status orsymbolic role as having deteriorated, often in ways perceived as unfair. Indeed, men whoidentify as Losers of Feminism are 2.7 times more likely to report voting for a RWPP, while forthose categorised as Losers of Globalisation, the figure is 2.4 times.The analysis also shows that relative deprivation—both past (status loss) and futureoriented(status threat)—is reported by a significant proportion of respondents (34% and51%, respectively), with men consistently more likely to report such feelings than women(with a gender gap of 4% and 2% across the two respective dimensions of relativedeprivation). These perceptions are not only cognitive but also emotional: a notable share ofrespondents, particularly those facing economic strain, report anger linked to perceivedstatus decline, supporting the idea that affective responses play a role in politicalmobilisation. RWPP voters, again, emerge as particularly susceptible to these perceptions,suggesting that their support is shaped by both material and symbolic dimensions ofperceived injustice. Among men, these feelings of deprivation are not only driven by financialinsecurity, but also by perceived contradictions between their gender identity and changingsocietal norms—especially among those with high household income and strong male GCI.For women, economic hardship remains the key driver, but higher education and strongfemale GCI can mitigate these feelings.Another major finding concerns to gendered collective identity (GCI). The data revealthat around one‐third of men and nearly half of women report some sense of collectiveidentity aligned with their gender. However, the political alignment of these identities differssignificantly: male GCI is most prevalent among RWPP voters, while female GCI is morecommon among supporters of left‐wing parties. This is particularly pronounced among youngmale RWPP voters, where male GCI is especially strong, whereas female RWPP voters exhibitweaker gender identification than their left‐leaning counterparts. These patterns reveal thatgendered identity is not only unevenly distributed but ideologically structured, reinforcing theassociation between male collective identity and right‐wing populist support. This distinctionunderscores the ideological structuring of collective gender identity in political attitudes andreinforces the need to understand radical right support as partly driven by collective identityconcerns, particularly among men.The analyses also identify two distinct logics of RWPP voting. The first is expressive:for some, voting for RWPP is a way to symbolically reject mainstream parties, liberal socialchanges, or perceived cultural marginalisation. The second is instrumental: many voters,especially women, cite the party’s perceived strength or credibility in delivering policyoutcomes as a reason for support. These logics are not mutually exclusive and often co‐existwithin individuals. Among RWPP voters, 8% are classified as expressive voters, while asubstantially larger 48% are instrumental voters, suggesting that strategic considerationsoutweigh symbolic ones in aggregate terms. However, men are overrepresented in theexpressive group, while women dominate the instrumental group, pointing to gendered logicsof mobilisation. Importantly, while men tend to prioritise symbolic concerns and identityrelatedgrievances, women’s support for RWPPs is more often grounded in economicinsecurity and institutional distrust.Taken together, these findings contribute to a more nuanced understanding ofpolitical behaviour in contemporary Europe, particularly in relation to gender, inequality, andsupport for the right‐wing populist parties. They highlight that attitudes often consideredirrational or affective—such as resentment or symbolic grievance—are in fact rooted inconsistent patterns of identity, perception, and experience. Importantly, the distinctionbetween Losers of Globalisation and Losers of Feminism is empirically robust: our analysesshow little overlap between the two, confirming that they capture distinct forms of perceiveddisadvantage affecting different segments of the electorate. This complexity must beconsidered in both academic analyses and in designing policy responses to democraticdisaffection and polarisation.