The InterPlanetary File System (IPFS) has been extensively promoted as a decentralized, censorship-resistant, and fault-tolerant storage protocol. This paper systematically dismantles these claims by demonstrating four critical and compounding vulnerability classes: (1) the structural dependency on centralized pinning services such as Pinata, Infura, and Web3.Storage, where compromising a single provider's dashboard or API effectively eliminates supposedly “immutable” content; (2) the futility of self-hosted pinning nodes as a mitigation strategy, given their susceptibility to targeted Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks capable of rendering them permanently unreachable; (3) the catastrophic implications of a cryptographic backdoor or collision discovery in SHA-256 or SHA-3 (Keccak), which would enable arbitrary content substitution while preserving valid Content Identifiers (CIDs), thereby destroying IPFS's fundamental integrity guarantees; and (4) the vulnerability of distributed pinning strategies to gossip-protocol-based reconnaissance attacks, wherein a state-level adversary (e.g., NSA, GCHQ, or equivalent) can enumerate all nodes hosting a target CID by compromising a single peer and leveraging protocol-level metadata propagation to systematically identify and neutralize every replica simultaneously. We formalize each attack vector with mathematical models, provide proof-of-concept algorithms, analyze the compounding effects of multi-vector attacks, and demonstrate that even the most sophisticated defense-in-depth strategies fail against a sufficiently resourced adversary. Our analysis conclusively establishes that IPFS, as deployed in practice, provides no meaningful censorship resistance and constitutes what we term Decentralization Theater—a system that employs the aesthetics and terminology of decentralization while maintaining the vulnerability profile of traditional centralized architectures, augmented by a dangerous false sense of security.