
Government spending is optimized for lobbying intensity, not net societal value. Programs with 100:1 benefit-cost ratios get billions while programs with negative returns get hundreds of billions. Incentive Alignment Bonds flip this by creating a capital pool that rewards politicians (via campaign support and post-office opportunities) for funding high-NSV programs over low-NSV alternatives. The result: public good becomes private profit for both investors and elected officials.
Category: Academic Paper, Political Economy, Mechanism Design, Public Policy | Genre: Political Science, Economics, Mechanism Design, Public Policy | Target Audience: Researchers, Policy Makers, Political Scientists, Economists, Political Reform Advocates
incentive-alignment, public-goods, incentive-compatibility, collective-action, social-impact-bonds, political-economy, campaign-finance, public-choice, net-societal-value, mechanism-design
incentive-alignment, public-goods, incentive-compatibility, collective-action, social-impact-bonds, political-economy, campaign-finance, public-choice, net-societal-value, mechanism-design
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