INdependent rediscoveries are systematically devalued in academic evaluation once a result is known to have been established earlier. This paper introduces chronocontextual epistemic injustice (CEI) to name and analyze this phenomenon. CEI occurs when an epistemic agent is denied appropriate credit for a discovery or theoretical reconstruction because (i) the same result has already been achieved by another agent (chrono-), and (ii) evaluative practices ignore the radically different cognitive, educational, and institutional conditions under which the later agent arrived at it (-contextual). Two agents who converge on the same theorem or framework are not epistemically equivalent: one may progress within dense infrastructures of prior concepts, mentorship, and institutional support, while the other reconstructs the result from a severely impoverished starting point. Yet conventional systems of attribution treat these achievements as identical—or erase the later achievement altogether. I argue that CEI constitutes a genuine epistemic injustice, distinct from testimonial injustice, hermeneutical injustice, the Matthew Effect, and simple misattribution. After developing a two-factor account and defending its distinctness against neighboring concepts, I propose evaluative reforms: structured independence claims in peer review, context-sensitive credit allocation, and explicit recognition of “bootstrap cost” in hiring and promotion