This paper specifies the upstream conditions under which institutional judgment becomes possible: what qualifies as admissible evidence, how information becomes decision-grade, and how judgment becomes legitimate as a responsibility-bearing act inside accountable procedures. The central claim is structural rather than psychological: judgment is not the starting point of institutional reasoning. It becomes institutionally meaningful only after heterogeneous materials are rendered into stabilized objects under explicit admissibility rules—objects that can be traced, reviewed, and closed in recordable form (Power, 1997; Scott, 1998; Bowker & Star, 1999). The paper advances Fiscal Epistemology as a discipline statement for decision-grade knowledge. It defines “decision-grade” not by persuasion, narrative coherence, or popularity, but by eligibility for entry into a closure-capable chain: identifiable provenance, traceable transformation through epistemic filters, and binding to an auditable accountability pathway (Weber, 1978; Power, 1997). This framing treats institutional tension as a baseline condition of institutional life: tension is not an anomaly to be eliminated, but the normal friction through which rules, categories, and cases are repeatedly updated and made executable (Scott, 1998; Bowker & Star, 1999). Fiscal Geometry (FG) is positioned only as a praxis background—a representational craft for making institutional tension structurally readable—named to clarify the paper’s stance on object rendering, but not developed here as a method. The contribution is intentionally upstream and interdisciplinary: it offers an interface language for distinguishing what narratives can explain from what institutions can process, and for clarifying the threshold at which information becomes executable within responsibility-bearing, reviewable procedures—without predicting institutional collapse, proposing reforms, or engaging motive- or intent-based debates.