Current social security systems are designed assuming either "chronically impoverished individuals" or "temporarily unemployed workers," thereby institutionally excluding "individuals with capabilities who temporarily fall into economic distress" (recoverable distressed individuals). This paper elucidates structural defects in current systems through case study analysis based on the author's personal experience and theoretical analysis using a dynamic mechanics model. Specifically, we identify five critical issues: (1) lack of early intervention due to static assessment criteria, (2) acceleration of collapse due to prior-year-based taxation, (3) information asymmetry in credit scoring, (4) time-scale mismatch in administrative response, and (5) institutional structures that create "economic rationality" for suicide through mortgage life insurance and joint guarantee systems. These problems pose significant risks of large-scale manifestation during future global economic crises. This paper proposes ten policy recommendations including early intervention through dynamic assessment, graduated support systems, and exception provisions for prior-year- based taxation. 現行の社会保障制度は「恒常的困窮者」または「一時的失業者」を想定して設計されて おり、「能力はあるが一時的に経済的困窮に陥った者」(回復可能な困窮者)を制度的 に排除している。本稿では、著者自身の体験に基づくケーススタディと動的力学モデル を用いた理論分析により、現行制度の構造的欠陥を明らかにする。特に、(1)静的判定に よる早期介入の欠如、(2)前年度ベース課税による崩壊加速、(3)信用情報の非対称性、 (4)窓口応答の遅延、(5)自殺の「経済的合理性」を生む団信・連帯保証制度の問題を指摘 する。これらの問題は、来るべき世界経済危機において大規模に顕在化するリスクがあ る。本稿は、動的判定による早期介入、段階的支援制度、前年度ベース課税の例外規定 など、10項目の政策提言を行う。