
Finite rational agents possess justified knowledge of necessary rational norms (NRNs), such as logical laws and principles of inference, despite their contingent cognitive capacities. This paper develops an exhaustive analytic trichotomy of non-theistic accounts of NRNs—mind-dependent, impersonal necessary, and brute—and argues that none can make such knowledge possible. Employing the Ontological Congruence Principle, each option is shown to render justification epistemically accidental. The resulting Rational Norms Dilemma Theorem establishes an impossibility claim: if non-theistic metaphysics is true, knowledge of NRNs is impossible. The eliminative result yields a minimal positive residue, motivating Epistemic Revelation as a necessary condition for non-accidental epistemic access. This paper does not presuppose theism, appeal to causal interaction with abstract objects, or rely on grounding frameworks.
Necessary rational norms; epistemic justification; transcendental arguments; modal epistemology; normativity; non-theism; Platonism; epistemic luck; rational intuition; epistemic revelation
Necessary rational norms; epistemic justification; transcendental arguments; modal epistemology; normativity; non-theism; Platonism; epistemic luck; rational intuition; epistemic revelation
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