With this article we aim to analyze casuistics (understood as the function of judgment) in Kantian cr\itical philosophy, in order to show how, on the one hand, the analytic of principles in the Critique of Pure Reason is casuistics in the strict sense (insofar as it intends to offer, in addition to the rule, the cases of application in a possible experience as a priori data); on the other hand, we intend to show that, insofar as the relation between the particular and the universal is transcendentally grounded, nevertheless this relation does not resolve the ‘particular’ tout court, but only the particular in general (überhaupt), or, to put it otherwise, through the analytic of principles theanalytic unity of phenomena is produced but not thesynthetic unity of phenomena, as will be explained later. Precisely by virtue of the insufficiency of a ‘transcendental casuistry,’ a critique of the faculty of judgment, which provides the principle for judging what in experience shows itself irreducible to the normative-categorical framework of the intellect, becomes necessary.