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Game-Theoretic Modeling of Government Stability: Evidence from India's One Nation, One Election Proposal

descriptionPublicationkeyboard_double_arrow_right Preprint Under curation English Publisher:Zenodo

Authors: Shekhar, Vidhu; Kumar, Milan;

doi: 10.5281/zenodo.17061251

Game-Theoretic Modeling of Government Stability: Evidence from India's One Nation, One Election Proposal

- Summary

Abstract

We develop a structural hazard model of government collapse attempts in India (1989–2024), where the option to reset tenure via midterm dissolution incentivizes instability. Estimation confirms that reset incentives are decisive: the option coefficient is 1.087. Counterfactual simulation under a One Nation One Election (ONOE) regime - which removes resets - predicts collapses fall by 70%, fresh elections by 61%, and full-term completion rises by 20 percentage points. Results demonstrate ONOE would fundamentally improve government stability.

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