This report summarises the execution and findings of a transnational access project conducted under the ERIGrid 2.0 framework, focusing on the cyber-resilience of microgrids composed of grid-forming (GFM) inverters. Initially proposed for VTT, the project was undertaken at the SINTEF Smart Grid Laboratory. The study investigates the cyber resilience of microgrids to constant False Data Injection (FDI) attacks targeting the frequency sensors of the secondary control layer. Full hardware experiments were performed to validate prior simulation-based insights regarding the impact of droop gains, R/X line ratios, and communication parameters on microgrid stability under attack. Results confirm that appropriate tuning of control and network parameters can enhance resilience and extend the stability region even under coordinated attacks, independent of active mitigation techniques. The project contributes toward understanding how system planning and parameter selection can complement cybersecurity efforts and reduce the risk of cascading failures in critical microgrid applications.