The REDEMOS Working Paper D6.2 investigates the role of Russia and China as external actors promoting autocratic influence in the European Union’s Eastern Neighbourhood (EN). It offers a novel conceptual and empirical framework to understand how these authoritarian powers exert influence over six EN countries – Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine – through various strategies tailored to their respective regime types and strategic choices. While the European Union has long supported democratic reforms in the region, alternative and often illiberal models advanced by Russia and China have increasingly challenged this orientation, especially since the early 2010s. The paper revitalises the theoretical debate on autocracy promotion by proposing an integrated framework based on the concept of Authoritarian Gravity Centres (AGCs). These are influential authoritarian states that project their governance models outward using a combination of material incentives, ideological narratives, and coercive means. The authors argue that autocracy promotion should be understood broadly as intentional influence aimed at weakening democratic institutions and empowering authoritarian actors, motivated by a mix of strategic, ideological, and regime-survival concerns. The paper identifies Russia and China as AGCs with both the capability and intent to shape governance norms beyond their borders. By combining the mechanisms of control, hard leverage, and subtle leverage, these actors adapt their strategies to support or undermine domestic political developments depending on whether the target regime is autocratic, hybrid, or democratic. This actor-centric approach contrasts with earlier, more static understandings of autocracy promotion. The paper draws on both qualitative and quantitative methods, including longitudinal analysis of foreign policy documents, speeches of key political stakeholders, and empirical data on trade, energy dependence, and diaspora presence. The findings show that Russia employs a broader, more coercive toolkit – including military intervention and propaganda – while China relies primarily on economic incentives and soft power. The degree of linkage between the authoritarian actor and the target state emerges as a critical variable mediating the extent and nature of influence. Empirically, the paper finds that autocratic consolidation is the dominant strategy in Belarus and Azerbaijan, while democratic delegitimation and autocratic empowerment characterise Russian and Chinese approaches to hybrid regimes such as Moldova, Georgia, and Armenia. Ukraine is a special case, where Russia has escalated from hybrid strategies to full-scale military aggression. China’s growing economic and technological capacity increasingly positions it as a provider of alternative governance models, though its political influence in the region remains secondary to Russia’s. The study also highlights a growing ideological self-confidence in both countries’ foreign policy agendas, reflected in the promotion of 'sovereign democracy' and ‘Chinese characteristics’ as viable alternatives to liberal democracy. The paper contributes to current research in three ways: it advances theoretical clarity by integrating multiple literatures on autocracy promotion; it adds empirical depth through a comparative analysis of both Russia and China; and it informs EU policy by identifying regime-specific vulnerabilities to external authoritarian influence. The study calls for a more differentiated and strategic response from democratic actors, particularly the EU, to counter the growing complexity of authoritarian promotion in its EN. Notably, the EU needs to adopt more nuanced, differentiated responses to authoritarian influence in the region, particularly in hybrid regimes where vulnerabilities are most pronounced. Understanding the varied strategies of autocracy promotion is crucial for reinforcing democratic resilience in the EN.