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Many electronic voting systems, classified mainly as homomorphic cryptography based, mix-net based and blind signature based, appear after the eighties when zero knowledge proofs were introduced. The common ground for all these three systems is that none of them works without real time cryptologic calculations that should be held on a server. As far as known, the agent-based approach has not been used in a secure electronic voting system. In this study, an agent-based electronic voting schema, which does not contain real time calculations on the server side, is proposed. Conventional cryptologic methods are used in the proposed schema and some of the requirements of an electronic voting system are constructed within the schema. The schema seems quite secure if the used cryptologic methods and agents are secure. In this paper, proposed schema will be explained and compared with already known electronic voting systems.