
The GTT23 dataset contains network metadata of encrypted traffic measured from exit relays in the Tor network over a 13-week measurement period in 2023. The metadata is suitable for analyzing and evaluating website fingerprinting attacks and defenses. Our dataset measurement process was designed to prioritize safety and privacy and was developed through consultation with the Tor Research Safety Board (TRSB, submission #37). Our TRSB interaction resulted in a “No Objections” score. The measurement process, additional safety and ethical considerations, and a statistical analysis of the dataset is presented in further detail in the article "A Measurement of Genuine Tor Traces for Realistic Website Fingerprinting", arXiv:2404.07892 [cs.CR], https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2404.07892.
Anonymous Communication, Traffic Analysis, Computer Security and Privacy, Website Fingerprinting
Anonymous Communication, Traffic Analysis, Computer Security and Privacy, Website Fingerprinting
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