Abstract: This contribution aims to make a clear distinction between public order measures that constitute a mere restriction of the free movement, thus falling within the ambit of art.2 of Protocol No.4 to the European Convention on Human Rights, and those amounting to a deprivation of liberty, thus coming within the scope of art.5 of the European Convention. The boundary between a mere restriction upon the free movement and a more severe deprivation of it is not always clear, even though it has important legal consequences. To that end, this article outlines the general principles applied by the European Court of Human Rights when considering whether there is a deprivation of liberty. It then gives an overview of the relevant Strasbourg Courts case law with regard to specific public order measures that have already been considered to involve a restriction of the free movement or a deprivation of it. In order to find some inspiration, it simultaneously compares these with the decisions of the Human Rights Committee and the prevailing law on this issue in Belgium and the United Kingdom, where new forms of freedom-restricting public order powers have recently been introduced and have already been assessed for involving a deprivation of liberty.