AbstractMultiple stakeholders have a vested interest in motor-carrier safety because it affects the welfare of the general public and companies' supply chain operations. This article develops new theory about motor carrier safety by utilizing processes from attention-based theory and new institutional theory to answer questions regarding carrier safety since the rollout of the Compliance, Safety, and Accountability (CSA) program. This research examines the propensity that carriers flagged for poor performance on hours-of-service (HOS) compliance when the program was fully implemented in late 2010 exited this status at least once during the subsequent 3.5 years. Conversely, it examines whether carriers not flagged for poor HOS performance at the start of the program come to receive a safety warning at least once during the subsequent 3.5 years. It further examines how carrier size affects these respective hazard rates. Hypothesized effects are tested using panel data from N = 484 large, for-hire carriers by fitting a series of discrete time hazard models. The results are consistent with the theory put forward. The article concludes by describing theoretical contributions, explaining managerial and public policy implications, noting limitations, and making recommendations for further inquiry.