In the first three chapters of this part, three different philosophical approaches to the theory of the natural sciences, each of which understands itself to be opposed to ‘positivism’, have been presented, and something of their background in different philosophical traditions sketched out. The task of this final chapter is to bring these three approaches into relation to each other, to draw preliminary conclusions on antipositivism in the theory of the natural sciences which can be carried forward to the discussion in the next part of this work on antipositivism in the philosophy of the social sciences. An initial point of orientation in this task of relating these three antipositivist approaches to each other is gained by recalling a point made in the introduction: that at the present time, when ‘positivism’ has become a term of abuse, the charge of being positivistic may be levelled against a theory which itself, in turn, conceives of itself as antipositivist and may return the charge against the accuser. It is, in fact, the aim of this work to contribute to the clarification of the confusion that thereby results.