Because of the dramatic political changes that have occurred over the past decade there is significant interest in understanding the dynamics of citizen support for nascent democratic institutions. The success of the new de- mocracies of the former communist regimes is a case in point. And in West- ern Europe, of course, there is considerable interest in understanding the dynamics of popular support for the rapidly changing institutions of the Euro- pean Union. One of the common themes found in these studies is the impor- tance of economic factors in shaping mass support for these new institutions. Duch (1995) has argued that in the context of new postcommunist regimes this relationship is often exaggerated and to some extent misspecified. We raise a similar concern with respect to the institutions of the European Union. We do not deny that economic considerations shape mass attitudes regarding the European Union. Rather we argue for a more careful specifica- tion of how economic outcomes are shaped by the European Union and hence how self-interested citizens are likely to incorporate economic out- comes into their evaluation of European integration. We make four arguments in this essay. First, we argue that models of the relationship between macroeconomic conditions and political preferences, in this case support for the European Union, must be based on a credible asso- ciation between the institution or political office and these economic out- comes. Because the European Union is, as yet, not responsible for macro- economic policies, we should not expect evaluations of these institutions to be shaped by policy outcomes in this area. Second, to the extent that economic factors do shape citizens' attitudes toward the European Union, it will be in terms of comparative advantage. Those best situated to reap benefits from the European Union will be more supportive than those who are less likely to