Perceptions of the opinions of others are examined on a variety of issues using data from three sample surveys of metropolitan Detroit. A greal deal of inaccuracy in such perception is evident. Three broad tendencies or patterns can be discerned: "looking glass perceptions," the general propensity to believe that others' opinions are the same as one's own; "conservative bias," the belief that the population is more conservative on racial issues than it actually is; and limited response to reality constraints. The overall findings suggest that perceptions of public beliefs and attitudes are personally and socially constructed to a much larger degree than is often assumed. James Fields is a Research Fellow at Southampton University in England. Howard Schuman is Professor of Sociology and Program Director, Survey Research Center, at the University of Michigan. The authors are indebted to Otis Dudley Duncan, Faculty Investigator for the 1971 Detroit Area Study; to Irwin Katz, who was co-designer with Schuman of the 1969 Detroit Area Study; and to Robert Angell, who was Faculty Investigator for the part of the 1956 Detroit Area Study on which we draw. The preparation of this report was supported by a grant (M H-26825) from the National Institute of Mental Health. A briefer version of this paper was presented at the American Sociological Association meetings, New York, August 1976. POQ 40 (1976) 427-448 This content downloaded from 157.55.39.144 on Wed, 07 Sep 2016 06:33:55 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 428 FIELDS AND SCHUMAN determination of what is false and what is true is itself a central issue in studying pluralistic ignorance. Instances of social perception and misperception of this type provide the subject matter and the problem of the present paper.' There is a considerable psychological literature on social perception, but most of it has dealt with the degree of accuracy involved when small numbers of carefully specified others are encountered under carefully controlled circumstances.2 These studies and the accompanying development of theory have suggested that accuracy of perceptions is related to such variables as communication (McLeod and Chaffee, 1973; Wackman, 1973), co-ordination (Scheff, 1967), and salience of the object (Niemi, 1974). Other studies have shown that perceptions are distorted in predictable ways by role relationship (Odiorne, 1954), attraction (Levinger and Breedlove, 1966; Newcomb, 1961), and personality traits (Scodel, 1973). There is also evidence that various indirect "cues," such as the other's social position, can affect perceptions (Tannenbaum, 1966; Berelson, et al., 1954). Little attention has been paid, however, to perceptions under less controlled and specified conditions. In particular, beliefs or perceptions held by individuals about natural groupings such as '"neighbors," and about the more generalized "other" which is represented by "public opinion," have seldom been systematically investigated, although incidental findings of apparent distortions in such perceptions have occasionally turned up (e.g., Saenger and Gilbert, 1950). Our own movement toward recognition of the importance of this problem may be instructive. Beginning with an interest in the issue of attitudebehavior consistency, we sought to test the widely held assumption that attitudes assessed in surveys are often not manifested in subsequent behavior because individuals believe significant others will be displeased (LaPiere, 1934; DeFleur and Westie, 1958; Schuman and Johnson, 1976). Thus, persons who favor "open housing" in a confidential interview situation might be unwilling to express that attitude in more public ways (for example, by endorsing a petition favoring open housing) for fear of upsetting their neighbors. So stated, it is not the neighbor's actual beliefs 1 The type of mental activity engaged in by a person in arriving at a description of an object (such as the opinion of a group of others) differs dependong on the degree to which the stimulus object is present. Sometimes it is suggested that "perception" be reserved for the stimulus-present situation (Tagiuri, 1968; Secord and Backman, 1964:45). The type of situation discussed here might more properly be thought of as a cognitive process involving memory and characterized as a "belief." Although the distinction is important, we will use the term "perception" in our discussion, as have many other authors (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee, 1954; Fendrich, 1967; Sewell, Haller, and Ohlindorf, 1970.) 2 For more general reviews of the social perception literature, see Tagiuri (1968), Bruner (1958), and Secord and Backman (1974), and for a discussion of related issues see the entire issue of the American Behavioral Scientist, (March-April 1973), especially the articles by Chaffee (1973) and McLeod and Chaffee (1973). This content downloaded from 157.55.39.144 on Wed, 07 Sep 2016 06:33:55 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms