In this chapter, I present the Theory of Vagueness as Arbitrariness (VA). In Sect. 5.1 I consider some minimal constraints on the use of vague predicates. I argue that the principle of tolerance should not be considered a constraint, and that the clear-case constraint should be replaced by the ideal-case constraint. In Sect. 5.2, I argue that the notion of ideal case does not imply a violation of the criterion of precisification, at least if we accept the following intuition: all admissible precisifications of a vague predicate are equally arbitrary. My interpretation of this intuition is the first part of my theory: the Thesis of Arbitrariness (TA). TA is in line with some of the main theses about vagueness advanced by Raffman and Sainsbury. Nonetheless, I propose that we should augment it in order to achieve a final definition of vague predicates. The result is VA. According to VA, a vague predicate is an arbitrary predicate that must be precisified in order to contribute to sentences with truth-conditions. VA naturally leads us to Semantic Nihilism. Following Braun and Sider, I argue that Semantic Nihilism can be made viable by an account of how vagueness is typically and harmlessly ignored. Because Braun and Sider’s proposal depends on the existence of a clear-case constraint, an alternative proposal is outlined. I then argue that VA satisfies all three criteria of adequacy for an ideal theory of vagueness, and that it correctly systematizes the relevant intuitions. The chapter closes with replies to some possible objections (Sect. 5.3).