Fairness and the Optimal Allocation of Ownership Rights
Copyright policy )Fairness and the Optimal Allocation of Ownership Rights
We report on several experiments on the optimal allocation of ownership rights. The experiments confirm the property rights approach by showing that the ownership structure affects relationship-specific investments and that subjects attain the most efficient ownership allocation despite starting from different initial conditions. However, in contrast to the property rights approach, the most efficient ownership structure is joint ownership. These results are neither consistent with the self-interest model nor with models that assume that all people behave fairly, but they can be explained by the theory of inequity aversion that focuses on the interaction between selfish and fair players.
Double Moral Hazard, Fairness, 330, Incomplete Contracts, double moral hazard, Reciprocity, Ownership Rights, Double Moral Hazard, Fairness, Reciprocity, Incomplete Contracts, fairness, Ownership Rights; Double Moral Hazard; Fairness; Reciprocity; Incomplete Contracts, 2002 Economics and Econometrics, Joint Venture, ownership rights, double moral hazard, fairness, reciprocity, incomplete contracts, reciprocity, Experiment, Gerechtigkeit, IEW Institute for Empirical Research in Economics (former), 10007 Department of Economics, C7, C9, incomplete contracts, double moral hazard; fairness; incomplete contracts; ownership rights; reciprocity, Moral Hazard, ddc:330, ownership rights, Eigentumsrechtstheorie, 300, 330 Economics, Ownership Rights, J3, Allokation, jel: jel:C9, jel: jel:C7, jel: jel:C70, jel: jel:C90, jel: jel:J30, jel: jel:J3
Double Moral Hazard, Fairness, 330, Incomplete Contracts, double moral hazard, Reciprocity, Ownership Rights, Double Moral Hazard, Fairness, Reciprocity, Incomplete Contracts, fairness, Ownership Rights; Double Moral Hazard; Fairness; Reciprocity; Incomplete Contracts, 2002 Economics and Econometrics, Joint Venture, ownership rights, double moral hazard, fairness, reciprocity, incomplete contracts, reciprocity, Experiment, Gerechtigkeit, IEW Institute for Empirical Research in Economics (former), 10007 Department of Economics, C7, C9, incomplete contracts, double moral hazard; fairness; incomplete contracts; ownership rights; reciprocity, Moral Hazard, ddc:330, ownership rights, Eigentumsrechtstheorie, 300, 330 Economics, Ownership Rights, J3, Allokation, jel: jel:C9, jel: jel:C7, jel: jel:C70, jel: jel:C90, jel: jel:J30, jel: jel:J3
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