I n analyzing the future of US-Taiwan relations, one must begin with the legal and political framework surrounding the normalization of relations with the People's Republic of China effected by the Carter Administration in late 1978 and early 1979.1 Despite President Reagan's personal feelings about Taiwan, his administration cannot disregard this framework without paying a significant political cost at home and abroad. There are, however, methods of maneuvering within the framework of normalization that each administration can resort to in order to maximize or minimize its relations with Taiwan. For this reason, the second part of this essay deals with Reagan's policy toward Taiwan. The last part will tackle some issues in implementing that policy, and their implications for US-Taiwan-PRC relations. When President Carter announced on December 15, 1978, that he had reached an agreement with the PRC to normalize relations, he virtually accepted all three PRC conditions for normalization-the severance of diplomatic relations with the ROC, the abrogation of the US-ROC mutual defense treaty, and the withdrawal of troops from Taiwan-all without receiving in return any promise from the PRC to refrain from using force against Taiwan. In fact, the only concession he received from the PRC was that the latter abstained from insisting on a US commitment not to sell arms to Taiwan following normalization. After the normalization process had been completed, however, the PRC did register its opposition to further US arms sales to Taiwan. On the issue of the legal status of Taiwan, Carter only "acknowledge(d)," but did not "recognize," "the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China."