This thesis provides three contributions to theoretical corporate finance in continuous time. The first contribution focus on regulation over patent litigation, the second on management dismissal, and the third on the capital structure of financial institutions. First, I study the effects of the Hatch-Waxman Integrity Act over the set of admissible financial positions available to an informed agent that requests an inter partes review to challenge a patent but wants to prevent expected losses of litigation. This Act requires that a person that short-sells the shares of a patent-holding company must wait ninety days before requesting an inter partes review. Enacting this Act does not harm informed agents. Instead, it decreases the percentage of the defendant's equity that a plaintiff must short-sell in order to hedge her expected loss of requesting the inter partes review. Also, short-selling hedging positions are smaller if the patent can inexpensively be converted into a commercial product, and if the value of this commercial product has low volatility. Second, I develop a continuous time model to study the Leicester-Pearson phenomenon, that is, the atypical cases of managerial dismissal triggered by high firm performance. My explanation proposes that differences in the knowledge and exerted effort between a firm's incumbent manager and an outsider candidate can cause this phenomenon. The firm has an option to replace the incumbent which is exercised when the outsider is considered better for the existing cash-flow level after paying replacement costs. I derive the level of cash-flows that triggers dismissal and identify the key condition that sustains dismissal with increasing cash-flow performance. The incumbent always faces this phenomenon if the outsider has comparative advantage in the effort attribute for which it suffices to have lower outsider's risk aversion and effort costs. Third, I study the relationship between three regulatory measures imposed in Europe after the 2008 crisis and the capital structure decisions of regulated banks. I analyse the increase of the level of coverage of Deposit Insurance Schemes, the introduction of the Private Sector Acquisition resolution tool, and the introduction of the bail-in tool. The introduction of these measures incentivises banks to decrease the ratio of equity over assets and to increase the ratio of deposits over total debt. Lastly, introducing the bail-in tool generates a recapitalisation option, that is, banks unable to rebalance their capital structure may have an incentive to increase ex-ante the weight of bail-inable debt over total debt if they expect that a potential bail-in will result in a value-enhancing recapitalisation.