In one of his late dialogues, Politicus, Plato articulates a formal critique of law. No law-code, human or divine, can comprehend ‘the fact that none of the human things is ever at rest’. The flux of things necessitates a flux of law. Nevertheless, Plato believes that a law-code’s volatility is both a sign and cause of a law-state’s instability. In Republic IV, for instance, he mocks democratic law-states for ‘ceaselessly instituting and revising a host of statutes’. The question of legal revision becomes salient in Plato’s late dialogues—and most visibly in his last dialogue, the Laws—precisely because it is a rational necessity which is a sign and a cause of structural instability. ‘No legal regime can remain perfect’, he insists in Laws XII, unless it is authorized ‘to revise any laws that are deficient’. Yet there can of course be no legal revision in the absence of legal critique. Thus, on my interpretation, Plato returns to the question of Socratic dissent in the last pages he ever penned—with vicious consequences.