The German jurist Werner Maihofer (1918-2009) is most often mentioned in domestic philosophical and legal literature in the context of his original approach to the combination of social and existential philosophy. The explanation of the concepts of interpersonal communication, social roles and positions, as well as the resulting socio-role expectations and interests with the methodology of both social and existential philosophy, allowed the jurist to talk not only about the existence (being) and sense of law, but also about its value. The concept of value is expressed by the author through the categories of expectation and interest. To date, in modern doctrine and judicial practice, much attention is paid to the development of the concept of «legitimate expectation», but their connection with Maihofer’s work on this issue has not yet received due attention. The need to rethink the meaning of the mentioned philosophical and legal concept can contribute to a better understanding of the institution of legitimate expectation, in particular, taking into account the fact that currently scientific doctrine is officially recognized as a source of law. In view of the above, the purpose of the proposed investigation is to study the content and meaning of the right category of expectations in the philosophical and legal concept of Werner Maihofer. As a result of the conducted research, it was established that Maihofer’s understanding of the concept of expectation is different from that established in modern legal doctrine and judicial practice, its legality is not determined by the individual’s realization of his subjective right, and the reasonableness of expectation is not related to compliance with the law. It acts as the basis of any normative requirement, assigns to the subject the limits of obligatory and forbidden behavior in a specific situation. Expectations in the understanding of the German jurist appear as the basis of law, which is contained in social images and roles and is actualized, changed and realized during responsible decision-making in life situations. Such expectations act as an axiological criterion of the procedure and result of law-making, thereby giving the resulting law sociological normativity and existential value. Law in this sense is depicted not only as mandatory, but also as necessary.