Gender Beliefs and Cooperation in a Public Goods Game
Copyright policy )Gender Beliefs and Cooperation in a Public Goods Game
This paper identifies gender beliefs in a public goods game and studies their impact on cooperation. On average, the beliefs of men, but not those of women, depend significantly on the group gender composition, with men expecting groups to be more cooperative when more females are present in the group. Gender beliefs of women are not absent, however, but show more variance than those of men. The contributions to the public good are driven by gender beliefs, and after controlling for them, contributions do not depend on the gender group composition directly.
Contains fulltext : 141058.pdf (Publisher’s version ) (Open Access)
7 p.
- Erasmus University Rotterdam Netherlands
- Radboud University Nijmegen Netherlands
gender beliefs, public goods experiment, gender differences, SDG 5 - Gender Equality, Gender and Power in Politics and Management, jel: jel:C9, jel: jel:H4
gender beliefs, public goods experiment, gender differences, SDG 5 - Gender Equality, Gender and Power in Politics and Management, jel: jel:C9, jel: jel:H4
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