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El aforamiento según la criminología: Selectividad en el proceso de criminalización de aforados en Brasil y en España

Authors: Quezado Soares, Marina;

El aforamiento según la criminología: Selectividad en el proceso de criminalización de aforados en Brasil y en España

Abstract

O presente trabalho analisa a prática da criminalização de altas autoridades públicas em dois países – Espanha e Brasil – a partir de uma regra de alteração de competência, presente nos dois sistemas processuais, denominada «prerrogativa de foro». A prerrogativa de foro é aplicada para o processamento de determinadas pessoas que, pela importância do cargo que ocupam, não são julgadas criminalmente ante o juiz ou tribunal que lhes corresponderia pelas regras ordinárias de competência, mas sim ante um tribunal distinto, superior. Indaga-se, neste trabalho, se este instituto procesal, objeto de críticas e de forte debate atual, reforça a impunidade dos detentores de poder. Para essa análise, foi realizada uma pesquisa empírica em dois órgãos judiciais de ambos países – o Tribunal Superior de Justiça de Catalunha, como amostra espanhola, e o Superior Tribunal de Justiça do Brasil – que observou os processos ali iniciados contra autoridades com prerrogativa de foro entre os anos 2008 e 2016. Os dados colhidos foram examinados a partir dos marcos teóricos da sociologia jurídico-penal e da Criminologia Crítica, especialmente os estudos sobre os crimes dos poderosos, para compreender não só o próprio instituto da prerrogativa de foro, mas também para verificar se ele afeta, e em que medida, a criminalização dos detentores de poder e a seletividade do sistema penal para as altas autoridades públicas. O presente trabalho identifica as semelhanças e diferenças da criminalização de autoridades com prerrogativa de foro em ambos países e discute se o debate atual pela eliminação dessa regra de competência se justifica em termo dos objetivos que pretende alcançar.

El presente trabajo analiza la práctica de la criminalización de altas autoridades públicas en dos países – España y Brasil – a partir de una regla de alteración de competencia, presente en los dos sistemas procesales, llamada «aforamiento». El aforamiento es aplicado para el enjuiciamiento de determinadas personas que, por la importancia del cargo que ocupan, no son juzgadas criminalmente ante el juez o tribunal que les correspondería por las reglas ordinarias de competencia, sino ante un tribunal distinto, superior. Se indaga, en este trabajo, si este instituto procesal, objeto de críticas y de fuerte debate actual, refuerza la impunidad de los detentores del poder. Para eso análisis, fue desarrollada una investigación empírica en dos órganos judiciales de ambos países – el Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Catalunya, como muestra para España, y el Superior Tribunal de Justicia de Brasil – que examinó los procesos contra aforados allí incoados entre 2008 y 2016. Los datos recogidos fueron observados a partir de los marcos teóricos de la sociología jurídico-penal y de la Criminología Crítica, especialmente los estudios sobre los crímenes de los poderosos, para comprender no sólo el instituto del aforamiento en sí, sino también para verificar si afecta, y en qué medida, la criminalización de los detentores del poder y la selectividad del sistema penal para las altas autoridades públicas. El presente trabajo identifica las similitudes y diferencias de la criminalización de aforados en ambos países y discute si el debate actual para eliminar el aforamiento se justifica en términos de los objetivos que se pretende alcanzar.

Aquest treball analitza la pràctica de la criminalització d’altes autoritats públiques en dos països – Espanya i Brasil – a partir d’una regla d’alteració de competència, present en els dos sistemes processals, anomenada «aforament». El aforament és aplicat en l’enjudiciament de determinades persones que, per la importància del càrrec que ocupen, no són jutjades criminalment davant del jutge o tribunal que li correspondria per les regles ordinàries de competència, sinó davant d’un tribunal diferent, superior. S’indaga, en aquest treball, si aquest institut processal, objecte de crítiques i de fort debat actual, reforça la impunitat dels detentors de poder. Per aquesta anàlisi, va ser desenvolupada una recerca empírica en dos òrgans judicials d’ambdós països - el Tribunal Superior de Justícia de Catalunya, com a mostra per a Espanya, i el Superior Tribunal de Justícia de Brasil – que va examinar els processos contra aforats allí incoats entre 2008 i 2016. Les dades recollides van ser observades a partir dels marcs teòrics de la sociologia jurídic- penal i de la Criminologia Crítica, especialment els estudis sobre els crims dels poderosos, per comprendre no sols l' institut de l’aforament en sí, sinó també per verificar si això afecta, i en quina mesura, la criminalització dels detentors del poder i la selectivitat del sistema penal per a les altes autoritats públiques. El present treball identifica les similituds i diferències de la criminalització d’aforats en ambdós països i discuteix si el debat actual per eliminar l’aforament es justifica en termes dels objectius que es pretén aconseguir.

This work analyses the criminalisation of high public officials in the judicial practice of two countries – Spain and Brazil – following a change of legal jurisdiction in the prosecution system of both countries, called “privilege of court”. This rule applies to people who, due to the importance of the public positions they occupy, are not prosecuted according to ordinary criminal procedures, before a judge or court, but before a higher court. In this work, I question whether this rule, object at the moment of a high criticism and strong debate, reinforces, in the criminal justice system, the impunity of those in power. For this study, empirical research was carried out in the judicial courts of each country – the Superior Court of Justice in Catalonia, as an example for Spain, and the Superior Court of Justice in Brazil – into the criminal procedures filed against high-level government officials between 2008 and 2016. The collected data was analysed from the theoretical frameworks of legal-criminal sociology and critical criminology, in particular the studies on the crimes of the powerful, in order not only to understand the origins and justifications of this law, but also to verify if - and to what degree - it affects the criminalisation of those in power and the selectivity of the criminal system for high public officials. This study identifies similarities and differences in the criminalisation of high- level government officials in both countries and discusses whether the present debate into the elimination of this law can reach its intended aims.

Programa de Doctorat Dret i Ciència Política

Country
Spain
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Keywords

Corrupción política, Corrupció política, Brasil, España, Criminología, Criminology, Criminologia, 34, Political corruption, Derecho procesal, Derecho comparado, Spain, Procedural law, Dret processal, Dret comparat, Espanya, Comparative law, Ciències Jurídiques, Econòmiques i Socials, Brazil

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This is an alternative to the "Influence" indicator, which also reflects the overall/total impact of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network (diachronically).
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popularity
This indicator reflects the "current" impact/attention (the "hype") of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network.
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influence
This indicator reflects the overall/total impact of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network (diachronically).
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impulse
This indicator reflects the initial momentum of an article directly after its publication, based on the underlying citation network.
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