In philosophy of language, the phenomena fundamental to human communication are routinely modeled in ways that do not require commitment to a concept of “information” separate from those of “data,” “meaning,” “communication,” “knowledge,” and “relevance” (inter alia). A taxonomy of conceptions of information may be developed that relies on commonly drawn philosophical distinctions (between linguistic, mental, and physical entities, between objects and events, and between particulars and universals); in such a taxonomy, no category requires the label “information” in order to be differentiated from others. It is suggested that a conception of information-as-relevance is currently the most productive of advances in theoretical information studies. ; Submitted by Russell Clark (rclark@uiuc.edu) on 2007-07-23T20:19:49Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Furner427446.pdf: 116394 bytes, checksum: aaa2649c365f8fe6108d84ed57450eb4 (MD5) ; Made available in DSpace on 2007-07-23T20:19:49Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Furner427446.pdf: 116394 bytes, checksum: aaa2649c365f8fe6108d84ed57450eb4 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2004 ; published or submitted for publication