This thesis examines the combination problem for panpsychism and its responses. Panpsychism is the view that fundamental physical entities instantiate phenomenal properties and that our consciousness, in some way, comes from those phenomenal properties. Proponents of panpsychism have argued that it is able to retain key benefits of physicalism over dualism whilst responding to objections to physicalism. However, the view is exposed to one notable problem called the combination problem. Roughly, this problem concerns how the microphenomenal properties of the physical combine to form our consciousness. In this thesis, I examine the combination problem and argue against proposed solutions. In assessing the problem, I separate it into two types of combination problems: subject combination, and quality combination. I identify several strategies available to the panpsychist in response to these issues. I then assess those strategies at length and argue they fail to save constitutive panpsychism. I then address an argument that combination problems exist in all theories of the mind and argue that panpsychism is uniquely disposed to it. I conclude that many of the virtues of panpsychism dispose it to combination problems.