On pure bargaining problems

Pure bargaining problems are considered. By attaching a quasi–additive cooperative game to each one of them, a Shapley rule for this class of problems is derived from the Shapley value for cooperative games. The analysis of this new rule includes some axiomatic characterizations and a comparison with the classical proportional rule.

Country

Spain

Related Organizations

Universitat Polite`cnica de Catalunya
Spain

Keywords

Jocs cooperatius (Matemàtica), Àrees temàtiques de la UPC::Matemàtiques i estadística::Investigació operativa, :91 Game theory, economics, social and behavioral sciences::91A Game theory [Classificació AMS], :Matemàtiques i estadística::Investigació operativa [Àrees temàtiques de la UPC], Classificació AMS::91 Game theory, economics, social and behavioral sciences::91A Game theory, Game theory, Investigació operativa -- Congressos, Cooperative games (Mathematics)

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